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Data sharing is an essential element of research; however, recent scientific and social developments have
challenged conventional methods for protecting privacy. Here we provide guidance for determining data
sharing thresholds for human pluripotent stem cell research aimed at a wide range of stakeholders, including
research consortia, biorepositories, policy-makers, and funders.The discovery of technologies to generate
induced pluripotent stem cell (iPSC) lines
and the corresponding derivation of large
numbers of these lines for research and
potential therapeutic use have resulted
in a rejuvenated interest in biorepositories
(McKernan and Watt, 2013; Stacey et al.,
2013). Biorepositories are vital infrastruc-
tures providing primary material (primary
samples, cell lines, and associated data)
for research and clinical translation.
Today, biorepositories serve also as the
primary resource for authenticated, qual-
ity controlled, and ethically sourced hu-
man pluripotent stem cell (hPSC) lines.
Robust banking networks now enable
global access to well-characterized and
traceable hPSCs, an essential prerequi-
site for scientific reproducibility (Staceyet al., 2013). The availability of such
resources presents a wide range of
therapeutic opportunities; however, shar-
ing them also comes with an attendant re-
sponsibility to protect donors’ or research
participants’ (hereinafter ‘‘participants’’)
privacy.
These competing factors require strik-
ing a delicate balance between the
amount and quality of data collected and
the precautions taken when sharing
such information. Comprehensive data
curation is important because cell-line
misidentification continues to be a
pervasive problem, undermining the
scope and authenticity of research find-
ings. In addition, well-annotated genomic
and epigenomic data, and participants’
phenotypic and demographic data,Cell Stem Cefacilitates disease modeling and drug
development and contributes to the
understanding of genetic variation and
its role in normal cell behavior. Next gene-
ration sequencing (NGS) technologies
combined with bioinformatic data sys-
tems enable data analysis on awide range
of participants, facilitating the translation
of cell-based-therapies (Kreiner and Irion,
2013; McKernan and Watt, 2013).
In this Forum,wediscuss thechallenges
of establishing thresholds for sharing and
publishing individual/summary data asso-
ciated with hPSC research. We review the
ensuing scientific, socioethical, and legal
implications and propose a framework
with criteria for data sharing policies. Our
recommendations are directed at a wide
range of stakeholders.ll 14, April 3, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 427
Cell Stem Cell
ForumData Sharing, Privacy, and
Reidentifiability
Fundamental scientific data can be
perceived as a community resource.
Data sharing constitutes an ethical and
scientific imperative that is recognized
by international funders and scientific
organizations across disciplines and
jurisdictions (Knoppers, 2010; Kaye,
2012). This imperative is underpinned by
the principles of reciprocity, solidarity,
and respect for all stakeholders. Data
sharing is envisaged as a tripartite re-
sponsibility of data producers, users,
and funders (Isasi et al., 2012; Knoppers
et al., 2011). Scientific integrity and
progress are dependent not only on
the sharing of raw data between re-
searchers, but also on the ability to widely
disseminate research findings. In turn,
public trust is earned and maintained
by responsible stewardship. The latter
entails protecting—and possibly also
promoting—the interests of participants
while advancing societal benefits. More-
over, trust requires respecting divergent
interests by balancing benefits and risks
in a proportionate and appropriate
manner (Rodriguez et al., 2013).
Several scientific and social develop-
ments are prompting reconsideration
of how the imperative of data sharing
is conceptualized and implemented. The
decreasing costs and increasing acces-
sibility of NGS and cloud computing,
along with the growing volume, richness,
and complexity of genomic information
available, are challenging individual pri-
vacy and the traditional methods de-
signed to manage and secure such data
(e.g., coding and anonymization). These
factors, together with reports of the ease
of reidentification in the scientific litera-
ture and popular press, contribute to
changing public attitudes on the meaning
of individual privacy and attendant ex-
pectations about the fiduciary duties of
data stewards (Kaye, 2012; Rodriguez
et al., 2013).
Empirical studies to assess partici-
pants’ data sharing decisions and atti-
tudes demonstrate that regarding clinical
and genetics research, participants are
overall ‘‘health informational altruists.’’
Such studies are reassuring because
they suggest that an inability to guarantee
privacy may not deter individuals from
participating in research (Rodriguez
et al., 2013). However, there is also a428 Cell Stem Cell 14, April 3, 2014 ª2014 Elneed to consider mitigating actions to
ensure that participants trust in science.
For example, participants often wish
to be involved in decision-making and
have concerns about governance mecha-
nisms safeguarding privacy. In addition,
these studies show that participants’
privacy-utility trade-off decisions vary in
real versus hypothetical scenarios (Kaye,
2012). With hPSC research specifically,
there is emerging evidence that parti-
cipants broadly support data sharing
even while maintaining privacy concerns.
Further research is needed to systema-
tically assess participants’ views (Das-
gupta et al., 2014).
We are at a crucial juncture where novel
statistical methods and associated tools
allow the drawing of inferences, possibly
revealing the identity of individual partici-
pants in biomedical research. Genomic
information is both intrinsically self-identi-
fying and a source of familial information.
A recent study demonstrated that re-
identification is possible even in the
absence of a reference sample (Gymrek
et al., 2013). Several genomic studies
also demonstrated a wide range of sce-
narios in which reidentifying participants
in biomedical research could be possible
by triangulating multiple publicly available
data sources (e.g., census and genealogy
data, obituaries, voter registries, etc.). It
has been established that relying on as
few as 75 individual (statistically indepen-
dent) SNP loci could enable unique indi-
vidual identifiability (Gymrek et al., 2013;
Rodriguez et al., 2013).
Reidentification is the ability of pro-
tected data to be traced back to a partic-
ipant. It can occur directly or indirectly,
deliberately or unintentionally, and by
different means: (1) directly, by matching
genomic data against a reference geno-
type; (2) by deduction, or by linking to
nongenetic databases (e.g., health care,
forensic, administrative, genealogical,
etc.) and matching it to genotype and
other associated data (e.g., gender, age,
disease status, etc.); and (3), by inference,
by profiling genomic data from DNA anal-
ysis (e.g., gender, blood type, etc.).
Consequently, individual identifiability is
currently present at incremental levels
from overtly identifiable to potentially
identifiable (Rodriguez et al., 2013; Gym-
rek et al., 2013; Kaye, 2012).
While the generalizability of the above-
mentioned methods and tools continuessevier Inc.to be evaluated, and evidence-based
risk reassessments continue to be
debated, it is clear that the concepts of
identifiability and privacy are shifting, as
are the expectations of stakeholders. For
a proportional and realistic risk assess-
ment, due consideration should be given
not only to the existence of multiple
data resources, potential data users, and
malicious intruders, but also to different
data environments as a whole, which
extend well beyond the research context.
Privacy risk assessments should also be
situated in a society in which social media
and direct-to-consumer genetic testing
are omnipresent (Knoppers, 2010). In
this manner, individuals are broadly and
openly sharing their personal information,
genomic or otherwise, as well as their
family members’ information, either
directly or by association. These factors
increase the likelihood of participant
reidentification by expanding the range
of data resources publicly available that
can be used in combination with other
data sources to reidentify individuals.
They further create vulnerabilities in
governance mechanisms, decrease the
effectiveness of data security measures,
challenge the protections for privacy and
confidentiality, and thereby provide an
opportunity for participant reidentification
(Gymrek et al., 2013; Rodriguez et al.,
2013). For these reasons, relying solely
on traditional methods based on informed
consent and data coding or anonymiza-
tion (irreversibly stripping of identifiers)
is naive and insufficient to protect parti-
cipants’ privacy (Kaye, 2012). More
sophisticated security measures, in com-
bination with sanctions for deliberate
breaches of confidentiality, are required
to keep pace with technological develop-
ments (Knoppers et al., 2011).
A pivotal concern regarding identi-
fiability is the potential for personal and
health information to be associated with
a specific individual and the possible
harms of discrimination (e.g., in employ-
ment or insurance), stigmatization, stress,
and anxiety (Kaye, 2012). These harms
need not be confined to the individual
but could also be extended to a com-
munity or subpopulation to which the
participant belongs (based on disease
condition, ethnicity, or familial relations).
Needless to say, unintended or deliberate
misuse and disclosure of personal infor-
mation due to participant reidentifiability
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Forumbreaches the trust established between
researchers and participants. Therefore,
risks and harms are not restricted solely
to participants but are also present
for data stewards, researchers, and the
entire scientific enterprise (Rodriguez
et al., 2013; Knoppers et al., 2011).
It should also be emphasized, however,
that at the present time, concerns about
the reidentification of genomic data in
the research context are largely hypo-
thetical. There are no known/published
reports of breaches of confidentiality re-
sulting in actual harm to participants in
genetic research. Published examples
using statistical methods to reidentify
genomic data have been proofs of con-
cept rather than malicious uses of data
(Gymrek et al., 2013; Rodriguez et al.,
2013).
Scientific Considerations for hPSC
Line Derivation
Given that an hESC line reflects the con-
tributions of two genetically different indi-
viduals, genetic/genotype data arising
from an hESC line itself is unique to the
embryo/cell line and not directly attri-
butable to any individual donor. For this
reason, the possibility of donor reiden-
tification based solely upon the genotype
of an hESC line remains extremely
remote. However, while hESC-associated
data would not correspond directly to the
genotype of the individual donor or do-
nors, the information that can be gleaned
using diverse molecular analyses could
have medical and social significance
for the donors and related individuals.
Moreover, in some cases the interpreta-
tions of certain genetic data derived
from numerous loci (e.g., ethnicity), com-
bined with the laboratory of origin or par-
tial genotype information for a putative
donor or donors, could be sufficient
for the donors to identify themselves or
be identified by others by triangulation
with public information (Knoppers et al.,
2011; Isasi et al., 2012).
In contrast to hESC lines, iPSCs contain
donor-specific DNA. While the gene
insertion and reprogramming process
results in minor changes to the DNA
(such as changes in methylation patterns)
the genetic/genomic data arising in this
context remains virtually identical to that
of the donor. Consideration should be
given to circumstances in which the po-
tential for reidentifiability is exacerbated,as, for example, in the context of donors
affected by rare disorders, due to the
small population size, uniqueness of
their genotype, or media publicity, which
could allow the discovery of personal
data linked to the genetic information
(Isasi et al., 2012).
Toward a Policy Framework
For scientists, research consortia, bio-
repositories, and funding bodies, we
envisage a system for data sharing
grounded on the principles of good
governance that ensures a fair balance
between individual interests and public
benefits. Such a system should rely on
establishing different thresholds for data
sharing to minimize the chances of
triangulation of a particular data set
with other data sets that could further
facilitate the reidentification of a partici-
pant (Kaye, 2012). These thresholds
should be situated along a continuum
between overtly identifiable to potentially
identifiable data/samples (Rodriguez
et al., 2013). They should be subject to
ongoing reassessment to reflect the
pace of scientific discoveries, consider
changing public attitudes, and determine
contemporaneous concerns of partici-
pants with regards to the meaning of
individual privacy and attendant expec-
tations regarding the scope of the fidu-
ciary duties of data/sample custodians.
Moreover, the goal of open science and
the principles of transparency, autonomy,
and beneficence argue in favor of a
system of broad informed consent to
sharing genotypic and phenotypic data
of hPSC lines, subject to appropriate
governance (Knoppers et al., 2011; Isasi
et al., 2012). A robust consent process
entails empowering participants to make
their own risks-benefits assessment
before participation. It also requires
improving genetic literacy (Knoppers,
2010; Kaye, 2012; Rodriguez et al.,
2013). To that end, the consent process
should explicitly address data-sharing
scenarios and their implications for the
protection of participant’s privacy and
confidentiality. It should further disclose
the reasonably foreseeable likelihood of
reidentification without overstating the
likelihood of these risks materializing,
while also acknowledging the nonabso-
lute effectiveness of available protections.
We propose a framework with criteria
for data sharing policies for fundingCell Stem Cebodies, scientists, research consortia,
and biorepositories. Such policy should:
(1) Be consistent with participant con-
sent and conform to applicable
laws and ethics.Within the consent
process the limitations of data
protection measures should be
disclosed.
(2) Establish conditions for releasing
data that include a binding,
enforceable commitment by re-
searchers and data custodians to
not share such data with unautho-
rized third parties and not to use
the data alone or in combination
with other data sets to either
attempt or create the conditions
for the reidentification of an indi-
vidual participant. To that end,
oversight mechanisms should be
established.
(3) Manage data associated with a
given hPSC line (e.g., genomic,
epigenomic, phenotypic, and de-
mographic where available) based
on a proportional assessment
of the risks of individual identi-
fiability, tailored to the nature
of cell line derivation (e.g., hESCs
versus iPSCs). A cautious ap-
proach should be taken when
sharing raw sequence reads (e.g.,
whole genomes and full exomes),
short tandem repeats (STRs),
SNPs, or other identity profiles,
given that they can include sensi-
tive or personal information that
is directly identifiable or would
facilitate reidentification of other-
wise deidentified data. However,
research laboratories should be
encouraged to share STR profiles
of cell lines with bona fide re-
searchers and biorepositories.
Identity data (e.g., STRs, SNPs,
etc.) should be shared in strict
confidence and solely for the pur-
poses of confirming cell line iden-
tity for quality control purposes
and resolving cases of cell line
cross-contamination.
(4) Stipulate appropriate sanctions for
any breach by those authorized to
handle the data.
(5) In conformity with recommenda-
tion #3 above, make available sen-
sitive or personal data associated
with an hPSC line only to bonall 14, April 3, 2014 ª2014 Elsevier Inc. 429
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vided a protocol that is:
d Consistent with widely recognized
good research practice and with
applicable legal and ethical require-
ments;
d Aimed at generating new knowl-
edge and understanding using
rigorous scientific methods;
d Intended for publication and sharing
of research findings with the scien-
tific community without undue re-
strictions; and
d Reviewed by an independent over-
sight entity.
As the field of hPSC research evolves
and with changes in the potential reidenti-
fiability of participants, data stewards
should:
(1) Make appropriate adjustments to
their data sharing arrangements in
line with the considerations above;
and
(2) Avail themselves of research on
the concerns of hPSC participants
and use such information to guide
their data sharing practices.
There are no methods or governance
mechanisms that can ensure the absolute
protection of participant identity (Rodri-
guez et al., 2013; Kaye, 2012). Currently,
participant reidentification is rare. A pro-
portionate approach to privacy in this
context of data sharing should be
construed based on reasonably foresee-
able risks, thereby distinguishing between430 Cell Stem Cell 14, April 3, 2014 ª2014 Elperceived and real risks. Such an
approach should not rely on worst case
or hypothetical scenarios, nor should
it relate to situations in which the possi-
bility of identifiability remains negligible
(Knoppers, 2010). Most importantly, it
should be subject to ongoing reassess-
ment to reflect evolving scientific and
IT advances as well as changing public
attitudes (which sometimes react to
hypothetical scenarios) (Dasgupta et al.,
2014). Proportionate criteria for deter-
mining what risks are real or which are
remote for identifiability are needed to
avoid unnecessarily overexpanding pri-
vacy regulations that could hinder scien-
tific progress. Moreover, in drafting such
criteria, we should question whether in
information-rich societies, the goal of
complete deidentifiability to avoid pri-
vacy-related risks is a realistic or laudable
goal (Knoppers, 2010). No amount of
legal protection or ethical safeguards
can eliminate such risks. Enforceable
sanctions (e.g., withholding/terminating
actual/future funding or participation in
research projects or disclosing miscon-
duct to other funding bodies or stake-
holders) against those who misuse data
are more realistic and useful legal tools.
Furthermore, the use of a more trans-
parent terminology, such as ‘‘coded,’’
that does not refer to ‘‘deidentified’’ cell
lines and data—but instead acknowl-
edges the small but potential risk of
reidentification—may serve to provide
potential participants with a more accu-
rate basis for making informed decisionssevier Inc.about whether to assume these risks
and permit their cells and data to be
used in research.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
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